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1
Philip Snowden, Introduction to E. D. MOREL, TRUTH AND THE WAR, at ix (1916) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 372
INTRODUCTION
America’s Global War on Terror2 began as a direct response to the deadliest terrorist attack in modern history.3 On September 11, 2001, the Talibanbacked terrorist group al-Qaeda coordinated four separate attacks on New York
and Washington, D.C. that took the lives of nearly three thousand innocent
people.4 With strong domestic and international support, America invaded Afghanistan in October of 2001 with several focused objectives: overthrow the
Taliban government, destroy al-Qaeda’s training camps, and capture or kill
Osama bin Laden.5 Although U.S. military forces quickly overthrew the Taliban government and destroyed al-Qaeda’s network within Afghanistan’s borders,6 America soon found itself being drawn into global conflict as its resilient
and highly mobile enemy retreated across international borders to regroup and
return as an insurgent force.7 The U.S. military campaign was not deterred.
President Bush made America’s commitment clear, saying, “The message to
every country is, there will be a campaign against terrorist activity, a worldwide
campaign . . . Freedom-loving people understand that terrorism knows no borders, that terrorists will strike in order to bring fear . . . [a]nd we will not let
them do that.”8
The worldwide campaign against terrorism that President Bush promised in
2001 quickly became a reality⎯one that continues to this day. Besides the war
2

See 32 C.F.R. § 578.32 (2007); Anup Shah, War on Terror, GLOBAL ISSUES (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/245/war-on-terror.
3
U.S. War in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/uswar-afghanistan/p20018 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 11 1–
2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10288.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
4
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 3; 9/11 by the Numbers, N.Y. MAG. Sept. 2014,
http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm.
5
Interview by Tavis Smiley with U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/features/targeting-terrorists-counterterrorism-in-a-post911-world/destroying-al-qaeda-training-camps/.
6
See Satinder Bindra, India Identifies Terrorist Training Camps, CNN (Sept. 19, 2001, 9:36
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/19/inv.afghanistan.camp/; David Rohde & C.J. Chivers, A Nation Challenged; Qaeda’s Grocery Lists and Manuals of
Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nationchallenged-qaeda-s-grocery-lists-and-manuals-of-killing.html; DOD News Briefing, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 23, 2001, 2:15 PM), http://webcache.googleusercon
tent.com/search?q=cache:8uZXte0pPUoJ:www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx%3F
TranscriptID%3D2155+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (“I can tell you that we have struck
all of the terrorist training camps that we are aware of. I can’t tell you that I know what a
number is, and I think that you can appreciate that if al Qaeda has an ability to train, they
will try to make or find a camp that they can use. There aren’t going to be any camps that
we’re going to allow them to use, and when we find them, we’ll strike them.”).
7
See U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 3.
8
The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://20012009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
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in Afghanistan⎯the longest war in U.S. history9⎯America is currently engaged in armed conflicts10 in Pakistan,11 Yemen,12 and Uganda,13 and military
interventions14 in Iraq,15 Syria,16 and against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL).17 In addition, the U.S. has engaged in military actions18 in the
Philippines,19 under Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines;20 Mali,21
Chad,22 Mauritania,23 and Niger,24 under Operation Enduring Freedom—TransSahara;25 Somalia,26 Kenya,27 Djibouti,28 Sudan,29 and Eritrea,30 under Com9

Thomas Nagorski, Editor’s Notebook: Afghan War Now Country’s Longest, ABC NEWS
(June 7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/afghan-war-now-longest-war-us-history/st
ory?id=10849303.
10
See generally INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT”
DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 5 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org
/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (defining armed conflict as “armed
force between two or more States”).
11
Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.newyork
er.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare.
12
Get the Data: Drone Wars, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.the
bureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
13
Ken Opalo, The Consequences of the U.S. War on Terrorism in Africa, ALJAZEERA AM.
(June 2, 2014, 12:45 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/africom-u-s-waronterrorisminafricaalshabaabbokoharam.html.
14
See generally Military Intervention, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreediction
ary.com/military+intervention (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (“The deliberate act of a nation or
a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy.”).
15
Loveday Morris, The U.S. Military is Back Training Troops in Iraq, but It’s a Little Different This Time, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-usmilitary-is-back-training-troops-in-iraq-but-its-a-little-different-thistime/2015/01/08/11b9aa58-95f2-11e4-8385-866293322c2f_story.html.
16
Craig Whitlock, U.S. Military Leaders: Strikes in Syria Are Just the Start of a Prolonged
Campaign, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-attacksislamic-state-in-syria-with-five-middle-east-partners/2014/09/23/b78ad7e8-c8f2-4aa8-aaa7ec92572f6716_story.html.
17
Mark Thompson, U.S. Military Plan for Looming ISIS Offensive Takes Shape, TIME (Feb.
26, 2015), http://time.com/3722740/isis-islamic-state-military/.
18
As used here, the phrase “military actions” encompasses a broad range of activities based
on geographic location and other factors. It includes, but is not limited to, U.S. military base
agreements, regional counter-terrorism support, air strikes, training, weapons supply, and aid
and support projects. See infra, footnotes 19–47.
19
Jim Gomez, Deadly Filipino Anti-Terror Raid Bittersweet for U.S., MIL. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2015 9:23 AM), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/03/18/deadly-filipinoanti-terror-raid-bittersweet-for-us-forces/24951213/.
20
Joe Penney, The ‘War on Terror’ Rages in the Philippines, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 5, 2011,
10:31 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2011/10/2011104145947651645.
21
Maria Ryan, ‘War in Countries We are not at War With’: The ‘War on Terror’ on the Periphery from Bush to Obama, 48 INT’L POL. 364, 371 (2011).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, supra note 12.
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bined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa;31 Algeria,32 Morocco,33 Nigeria,34
Senegal,35 and Tunisia,36 under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative;37
and Georgia,38 Azerbaijan,39 Kazakhstan,40 Uzbekistan,41 Tajikistan,42 Kyrgyzstan,43 Ethiopia,44 Burkina Faso,45 Kashmir,46 and Libya.47 Collectively, these
thirty-two military actions comprise America’s Global War on Terror.
Maintaining an open-ended global war is a monumental task. In an effort to
keep up with its enemies, both old and new, the United States continually
adapts its military forces around the world. One such adaptation has been the
introduction and ever-increasing use of armed, remotely piloted aircraft, commonly referred to as “drones.”48 Drones are marketed to the public as the consummate wonder-weapon⎯one that prevents civilian casualties by striking enemies with “surgical precision.”49 The drone program is supplied with pilots
from the United States Air Force (“USAF”),50 but it is administered under two

27

Opalo, supra note 13.
Ryan, supra note 21, at 371.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 372.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 371.
38
Id. at 373.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Opalo, supra note 13.
45
Id.
46
Michael Smith, SAS Joins Kashmir Hunt for bin Laden, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2002, 12:01
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1385795/SAS-joins-Kashmirhunt-for-bin-Laden.html.
47
U.S. Military Airstrikes in Libya Likely Kill al-Qaida-Linked Militant, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 14, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/military/index.ssf/2015/06/us_mili
tary_airstrikes_in_liby.html.
48
Warren Bass, How the U.S. Stumbled into the Drone Era, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2014,
4:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-u-s-stumbled-into-the-drone-era-14062348
12.
49
John Brennen, White House Counterterrorism Adviser, Speech on Drone Ethics at the
Woodrow Wilson Center (May 1, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/
01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics.
50
Chris Woods, CIA’s Pakistan Drone Strikes Carried Out by Regular US Air Force Personnel,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
14,
2014,
9:30
AM),
http://www.theguardi
an.com/world/2014/apr/14/cia-drones-pakistan-us-air-force-documentary; Home of the
28
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distinct chains of command; the Department of Defense (“DOD”) directs operations in the war zone of Afghanistan,51 and the Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”) directs most, if not all, drone operations everywhere else.52 In a state of
war, such as that in Afghanistan, the use of armed drones by the USAF represents little more than the technological advancement of modern warfare.53 But
outside of war, targeted killing54 by the CIA’s drone program represents much
more. The CIA’s program operates without transparency, eliminating any opportunity for public or judicial scrutiny of military actions carried out in the
name of the United States and its citizens.55 The CIA does not disclose its criteria for selecting targets, its procedures for protecting non-combatants, the effect
of its operations on civilian populations, or the existence of authorization from
the sovereign nations in which the CIA deploys armed drones.56
Although the Director of the CIA, John Brennen, and the Obama Administration have assured the American public that the CIA’s drone operations are
“surgically precise,”57 the claim does not stand up to scrutiny.58 Before it was
Hunters, CREECH AIR FORCE BASE, http://www.creech.af.mil/units/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2015).
51
Alice K. Ross, Erased US Data Shows 1 in 4 Missiles in Afghan Airstrikes Now Fired by
Drone,
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM
(Mar.
12,
2013),
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/03/12/erased-us-data-shows-1-in-4-missiles-inafghan-airstrikes-now-fired-by-drone/; Micah Zenko, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to
Pentagon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferringcia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434.
52
See Greg Miller, CIA Remains Behind Most Drone Strikes, Despite Effort to Shift Campaign to Defense, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/cia-remains-behind-most-drone-strikes-despite-effort-toshift-campaign-to-defense/2013/11/25/c0c07a86-5386-11e3-a7f0-b790929232e1_story.html;
Zenko, supra note 51.
53
Christopher Drew, Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17uav.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
54
Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.
[T]argeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of
peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody.
“Targeted killing” is not a term distinctly defined under international law, but gained
currency in 2000 after Israel made public a policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the
Palestinian territories. The particular act of lethal force, usually undertaken by a nation’s intelligence or armed services, can vary widely—from cruise missiles to drone
strikes to special operations raids. The primary focus of U.S. targeted killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S. operations have expanded in recent years to include countries such as Somalia and Yemen.
Id.
55
Miller, supra note 52; Zenko, supra note 51.
56
Miller, supra note 52; Zenko, supra note 51.
57
Coll, supra note 11; see also Ken Dilanian, U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Rely on
Surgical Strikes, Unmanned Drones, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2011), http://articles.lati
mes.com/2011/jun/29/news/la-pn-al-qaeda-strategy-20110629; Devin Dwyer, Obama: Nobel
Peace Prize Winner Becomes Drone Warrior-in-Chief, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2012),
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usurped for the public relations campaign, the term “surgical precision” was not
used to define covert actions that resulted in double-digit civilian casualties.59
Before the CIA’s drone program, it would not have been understood to describe
erroneous strikes on civilian grandmothers,60 children,61 and innocent Americans.62 Nor would it have been used to describe strikes on a Yemeni wedding
party that left fourteen civilians dead.63 The term would not have been used to
describe the killing of twenty-six of the thirty-two people gathered to resolve a
mining dispute in Pakistan,64 or to describe the sixty-nine school children who
were killed when a drone strike destroyed their school so that the CIA could
eliminate the school’s headmaster, a known militant.65 Unfortunately, in the
course of America’s Global War on Terror, the term “surgically precise” has
been redefined to mean all of these things.
Alarmed by reports of civilian casualties and targeted killings that mirror
extrajudicial assassinations, concerned citizens and organizations have attempted to utilize the Freedom of Information Act to obtain records outlining the legal justification for the CIA’s use of armed drones in non-war zones.66 Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA” or “Act”) in 1966 in an
effort to increase the transparency of federal government agencies.67 The legislature structured FOIA to allow access “to official information long shielded
unnecessarily from public view and . . . to create a judicially enforceable public

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Blotter/obama-drone-warrior-chief/story?id=16451227;
Conor Friedersdorf, Calling U.S. Drone Strikes ‘Surgical’ Is Orwellian Propaganda,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/calling-usdrone-strikes-surgical-is-orwellian-propaganda/262920/.
58
See Coll, supra note 11. See also Dilanian, supra note 57; Dwyer, supra note 57; Friedersdorf, supra note 57.
59
Friedersdorf, supra note 57.
60
Karen McVeigh, Drone Strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani Family Tells of Mother’s
Death, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/wo
rld/2013/oct/29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress.
61
Chris Woods, The Day 69 Children Died, EXPRESS TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/229844/the-day-69-children-died/.
62
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter5-22-13.pdf.
63
Hakim Almasmari, Yemen Says U.S. Drone Struck a Wedding Convoy, Killing 14, CNN
(Dec. 13, 2013, 6:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/meast/yemen-u-s-dronewedding/.
64
Salman Masood & Pir Zubair Shah, C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html.
65
Woods, supra note 61.
66
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014); Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233
(D.D. Cir. 2012); First Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 12-1013 CW, 2014
WL 1411333, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014), vacated, No. C 12-1013 CW, 2014 WL
7148340 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014).
67
Nat’l Sec. Counselors, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
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right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands.”68
Recognizing the inherent difficulties in administering such a progressive piece
of legislation, Congress carefully designed FOIA to strike a workable balance
between broad provisions favoring public disclosure and specific exemptions
protecting certain legitimate government interests.69
Courts must make determinations of fact and law when adjudicating claims
arising under FOIA. Since FOIA’s enactment, courts have developed several
methods for efficiently dealing with the large number of cases resulting from
the government’s refusal to disclose documents requested under the Act. Courts
use two judicial constructs, the Vaughn index70 and the Glomar response,71 in
reviewing withheld documents, which allows them to quickly and correctly determine whether the claimed exemptions fit within the scope of the Act. The
courts have been effectively utilizing the Vaughn index and the Glomar response since the 1970s72 to ensure that Congress’s vision of an informed citizenry does not go beyond the scope of the exemptions provided by FOIA.
Although the courts had successfully and correctly applied FOIA law for
decades, the CIA created and began using the no number, no list response in
2004. Unlike the Vaughn index and the Glomar response, which help the withholding agency attempt to justify its exemptions to the reviewing court, the no
number, no list response is a simple assertion that documents responsive to a
FOIA request are exempt from disclosure.73 Since at least 2012, the CIA has
responded to FOIA requests regarding drone attacks with the no number, no list
response, allowing it to evade valid judicial proceedings, and ultimately, to operate outside the scope of the law.74
In light of the CIA’s numerous erroneous drone strikes and legally suspect
practices, this note argues that it is critical that the judicial branch apply FOIA
law as Congress intended, thereby eliminating the CIA’s ability to continue its
use of the no number, no list response. This note proceeds in four parts. Part I
provides a brief overview of the Freedom of Information Act and its exemptions, and describes the structure of the Vaughn index and the Glomar response.
68

John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989).
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 27 (1966); see also E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973),
superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), as recognized in CIA v Sims, 471 U.S. 159
(1985).
70
See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71
See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02
C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004).
72
See generally Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1009; Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919 at *7.
73
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2014); see ACLU v.
CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (giving a brief timeline of previous no number, no list
cases); see also First Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 12-1013 CW, 2014
WL 1411333, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014).
74
New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014); See N.Y. Times Co., 752 F.3d at
126.
69
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Part II outlines the CIA’s creation of the no number, no list response, and describes how it initially passed judicial scrutiny. Part III demonstrates how the
no number, no list response destroys the balance between the protections afforded by FOIA’s exemptions and the public’s “right to know.”75 Finally, Part
IV suggests eliminating the no number, no list response, and outlines the longstanding FOIA law that should operate in its place.
I.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: ITS PURPOSE AND EXEMPTIONS

Enacted by Congress on July 4, 1966, and taking effect one year later,76 the
Freedom of Information Act allows and encourages public access to federal
government records with the express purpose of lifting “the veil of administrative secrecy” and exposing government actions to public scrutiny.77 Under
FOIA, “any person”78 has a legally enforceable right to obtain records from any
of the fifteen departments or seventy-three agencies of the executive branch of
the federal government, which expressly includes the CIA, unless such records
fall within one of nine exemptions provided for in FOIA’s statutory language.79
The Freedom of Information Act provides that “[an] agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in
accordance with published rules . . . shall make the records promptly available
to any person.”80 The text outlines the procedures for properly requesting agency records.81 Under FOIA, “records” is broadly defined to include papers, letters, reports, video footage, pictures, audio recordings, and any other documentary information in the possession or control of a government agency.82 FOIA
requires that upon receipt of a records request, the agency grant or deny the request within twenty working days.83 If a record cannot be released, the withholding agency is required to assert one or more of FOIA’s nine statutory exemptions in its denial.84 The requestor may appeal the withholding agency’s
denial and, if necessary, may challenge it in court.85
75

U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 154 (1989).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT (2013).
77
Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
78
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). Under FOIA, “all United States citizens, as well as foreign nationals, are entitled to invoke the provisions of FOIA. Furthermore, requests for records, documents, and information may be made in the name of a corporation, partnership, and/or other entity. In other words, under FOIA, a request for federal
government records can be made by anyone, anywhere, and for any reason.” Elizabeth
O’Connor Tomlinson, Litigation Under Freedom of Information Act, 110 AM. JUR. TRIALS
367, § 5 (Aug. 2015).
79
What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
80
5 U.S.C. § 552.
81
Id.
82
Id. at (a)(3)(B).
83
Id. at (a)(6)(A)(i).
84
Id. at (b)(1)–(9).
76

(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
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A cause of action arises under FOIA when a government agency “(1) improperly (2) with[holds] (3) agency records.”86 “The agency asserting the exemption bears the burden of proof, and all doubts regarding the applicability of
the exemption must be resolved in favor of disclosure.”87 An agency may meet
its burden by providing affidavits that describe “the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the
information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption[s], and [that
it is] not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence
of agency bad faith.”88 “[C]onclusory affidavits that merely recite statutory

85

(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), if that
statute—
(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or
(ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld; and
(B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to
this paragraph.
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged
or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to
a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which
furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by
a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or
(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf
of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

Introduction to FOIA, FOIADVOCATES, http://www.foiadvocates.com/intro.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
86
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989).
87
Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing A. Michael’s Piano,
Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1994)).
88
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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standards, or are overly vague or sweeping will not . . . carry the government’s
burden . . . .”89
After hearing many cases involving the government’s refusal to disclose
properly requested records, the courts created the Vaughn index and the
Glomar response to aid in the proper and efficient handling of FOIA litigation.90 The circumstances under which one or the other is triggered differ
slightly, but the goal of each is the same: to prescribe the manner in which a
withholding agency must attempt to prove to the reviewing court that it properly denied a request under FOIA.
A. Vaughn Index
To allow for the quick and effective examination of an agency’s withheld
records, the withholding agency provides the reviewing court with a Vaughn
index. A Vaughn index “(1) describes the justifications for non-disclosure with
reasonably specific detail; (2) demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemptions; and (3) shows that the justifications
are not controverted by evidence in the record or by evidence of bad faith on
the part of the agency.”91
The index is the result of Vaughn v. Rosen, a 1973 case that addressed
challenges faced by the public when seeking information under FOIA, and the
difficult task shouldered by the courts in this unique area of law.92 At issue was
a FOIA request that had been directed to the Civil Service Commission, which
sought disclosure of certain reports from the Bureau of Personnel Management.93 The Director of the Civil Service Commission refused to release documents responsive to the request, asserting that the information was not subject
to disclosure under FOIA exemptions (b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(6).94 Upon the
agency’s refusal, the requestor, Robert Vaughn,95 filed an action in U.S. District Court seeking an injunctive order to compel the disclosure of the withheld
information.96 The Civil Service Commission responded with a motion to dismiss, supported only by a conclusory affidavit asserting that the Director of the
Commission held the opinion that the material was not subject to disclosure
under FOIA.97 Based solely on the opinion of the withholding agency’s direc-

89

Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
91
Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004) (citing Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992)).
92
See generally Vaughn, 484 F.2d 820.
93
Id. at 822.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 820.
96
Id. at 823.
97
Id.
90
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tor, the district court granted the agency’s motion to dismiss.98 Vaughn appealed.99
The Vaughn court began its discussion by outlining the then existing procedures government agencies used when asserting exemptions under FOIA.100
Although the Act was less than a decade old, the court found numerous examples where government agencies had provided conclusory affidavits declaring
that the factual nature of information requested under FOIA would not be disclosed pursuant to one of the various FOIA exemptions.101 Despite Congress’s
statutory mandate requiring the withholding agency prove the applicability of a
claimed exemption, the Vaughn court found that trial courts typically accepted
such affidavits due to the overwhelming volume of documents in question, often numbering in the hundreds or even thousands of pages.102 Even where a trial court did examine the withheld documents, the in camera (private) review
was necessarily conducted without the presence of the adverse party, heavily
undermining the adversarial nature of the U.S. legal system.103 The court found
that:
existing customary procedures foster inefficiency and create a situation in which
the Government need only carry its burden of proof against a party that is effectively helpless and a court system that is never designed to act in an adversary
capacity. It is vital that some process be formulated that will (1) assure that a
party’s right to information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation
and mischaracterization, and (2) permit the court system effectively and effi104
ciently to evaluate the factual nature of disputed information.

The Vaughn court formulated a three-step procedure for testing claimed
exemptions.105 First, in accordance with the provisions of FOIA, courts require
government agencies to provide relatively detailed justifications, proving the
appropriate exemptions for each withheld document.106 Second, agencies are
required to specify, separate, and index material, allowing the reviewing court
to quickly examine documents and compare them with claimed exemptions.107
Third, withholding agencies are required to justify exemptions, providing a basis for the adverse party to challenge the denial.108 The procedure, which came
to be known as the Vaughn index, satisfied the court’s goals.109 More importantly, it provided other courts with a tool to effectively handle FOIA litiga98

Id.
Id.
100
See id. at 824.
101
See id. at 825.
102
Id.
103
See id.
104
Id. at 826.
105
Id. at 826–28.
106
Id. at 826.
107
Id. at 827.
108
Id. at 828.
109
Id.
99
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tion going forward, enabling them to balance public interests against the interests of the government.110
While the purpose of the Vaughn index remains unchanged, more than forty years of litigation has fine-tuned its application to meet the myriad needs
arising under FOIA litigation. Where highly sensitive materials are involved, a
Vaughn index may consist of a “particularly persuasive affidavit”111 together
with brief descriptions of the withheld information. Alternatively, the agency
may request in camera review.112 Typically, however, “the index is public and
relatively specific in describing the kinds of documents the agency is withholding.”113 District courts have considerable discretion to determine what constitutes “reasonably specific detail”114 on a case-by-case basis. This allows the reviewing court to ensure the agency meets its burden of proof under FOIA,
while protecting the information it hopes to withhold.115 Ultimately, a Vaughn
index must provide the reviewing court with a “reasonable basis” for evaluating
the agency’s asserted exemptions.116
B. Glomar Response
Several years after the creation of the Vaughn index, unusual circumstances related to national security led to the creation of the Glomar response.117 The
Glomar response allows an agency to “refuse to confirm or deny the existence
of records,”118 but only when the knowledge of existence vel non (or nonexistence) of responsive records would itself cause harm.119
The Glomar response originated in Phillippi v. CIA during the height of the
Cold War.120 In 1968, a Soviet Golf-Class submarine, the K-129,121 sank 750
miles northwest of Hawaii, still laden with nuclear weapons.122 Shortly after the
sinking, business magnate Howard Hughes purportedly began construction on
110

See id. at 823.
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 122 (2d Cir. 2014), opinion
amended on denial of reh’g, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d
Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), citing with approval, ACLU v. CIA,
710 F.3d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
112
ACLU, 710 F.3d at 433.
113
Id. at 432.
114
Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
115
ACLU, 710 F.3d at 432.
116
Delaney, Migdail & Young v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
117
See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
118
ACLU, 710 F.3d at 426 (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
119
Id.
120
See Trent Schindler, Raising Sunken Ships, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/saf/1305/fea
tures/ship.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
121
Matthew Aid et al., Project Azorian: The CIA’s Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Feb. 22, 2010), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nuke
vault/ebb305/.
122
Schindler, supra note 120.
111
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the Hughes Glomar Explorer, an enormous barge allegedly meant for mining
manganese nodules from the ocean floor.123 In fact, Howard Hughes and his
manganese nodule mining project were part of an elaborate cover story; the
Hughes Glomar Explorer had actually been commissioned by the CIA as part
of an ambitious and covert plan to raise the Soviet submarine.124
Several news organizations published rumors regarding the true purpose of
the Hughes Glomar Explorer, and in 1975, journalist Harriet Phillippi125 submitted a FOIA request to the CIA, seeking any documents that it possessed regarding the vessel.126 The CIA denied the request, claiming that “any records
that might exist which reveal any CIA connection with or interest in the activities of the Glomar Explorer; and, indeed, any data that might reveal the existence of any such records” were exempt under FOIA, and therefore, not subject
to disclosure.127 After Phillippi’s appeal to the agency failed, she filed for injunctive relief in U.S. District Court, seeking justification for each document on
which the CIA had asserted an exemption.128 In response, the CIA submitted an
affidavit to the court in camera, signed by Brent Scowcroft, then Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs.129 The affidavit asserted that
“[o]fficial acknowledgement of the involvement of specific United States Government agencies would disclose the nature and purpose of the Program and
could . . . severely damage the foreign relations and the national defense of the
United States.”130 After reviewing Scowcroft’s affidavit, the district court
found that the withheld material was properly exempt from disclosure under
FOIA.131 The court granted summary judgment for the CIA, and Phillippi appealed.132
The issue decided by the Phillippi court was not whether the documents
must be disclosed; rather, it decided whether “the Agency should have been required to support its position on the basis of the public record.”133 The court determined that in the limited circumstances where an agency “can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records, there are no relevant
documents for the court to examine other than the affidavits which explain the
Agency’s refusal.”134 The Phillippi court found that the public record consisted
entirely of rumors published in newspapers, not disclosures by the agency it123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id.
Aid, supra note 121.
Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1013–14.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1013.
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self.135 The court held that this alone did not waive the agency’s right to assert
what is now referred to as a Glomar response.136
A Glomar response is an “exception to the general rule that agencies must
acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA request and
provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that information
. . . .”137 A Glomar response is therefore permitted only when confirming or
denying the existence of records would itself “cause harm cognizable under [a]
FOIA exemption.”138 Accordingly, to determine whether the existence vel non
of agency records fits an exemption under FOIA, courts apply the review
standards established in non-Glomar cases.139 Because a Glomar response is
properly invoked only when the disclosure of the existence or nonexistence of
agency records is itself exempt under FOIA, requestors may overcome this response by showing that the agency has already disclosed the existence vel non
of responsive records.140 Still, a failed Glomar response does not necessarily
mean that a government agency will be compelled to disclose information otherwise protected under FOIA’s exemptions.141 However, once information on
the existence vel non has been disclosed, the agency must provide the reviewing court with a Vaughn index to allow it to “determine whether the contents—
as distinguished from the existence—of the officially acknowledged records
may be protected from disclosure . . . .”142
II. AN EXTRAJUDICIAL SOLUTION TO A NON-PROBLEM: THE CIA’S “NO
NUMBER, NO LIST” RESPONSE
The no number, no list response was first considered by a court in Bassiouni v. CIA,143 nearly three decades after the Vaughn index and the Glomar response were established. The “no number, no list response acknowledges the
existence of documents responsive to [a FOIA] request, but neither numbers
nor identifies them by title or description.”144 The response originated as a simple legal misunderstanding, asserted by the Information Review Officer for the
Directorate of Operations of the CIA,145 but began to take on a sense of quasi-

135

Id. at 1017.
Id.
137
Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
138
Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
139
Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
140
ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
141
Id. at 432.
142
Wolf, 473 F.3d at 380.
143
Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004)
aff’d, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004).
144
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
145
See Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919, at *4–5.
136
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legitimacy as it passed through courts for more than a decade before being detected.
A. Bassiouni v. CIA—District Court
In 1983, Mahmoud Bassiouni wrote to the CIA seeking all material it possessed regarding himself, pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974.146 The CIA responded that it had material responsive to his request, but that it was classified
and could not be released.147 Sixteen years later, in 1999, Bassiouni wrote to
the CIA seeking the same records, this time utilizing the rights afforded to him
under FOIA.148 When the CIA again refused to disclose all relevant responsive
records, Bassiouni filed suit in U.S. District Court to compel the CIA to produce a Vaughn index to justify its claimed exemptions under FOIA.149 The CIA
moved for summary judgment and submitted a detailed affidavit (hereinafter
“McNair Declaration”) signed by William McNair, then Information Review
Officer for the Directorate of Operations of the CIA.150 The McNair Declaration asserted McNair’s authority, pursuant to Executive Order 12,958, to conduct classification reviews and make classification decisions.151 The McNair
Declaration states, in part:
This case is one in which the CIA would normally use a Glomar response—
neither confirming nor denying it holds documents on plaintiff. However, since
the CIA personnel handling plaintiff’s 1983 Privacy Act request acknowledged
the Agency held material on plaintiff at that time, CIA cannot use the Glomar
response in 2003. The only practical alternative at this point, to protect classified
and otherwise exempt information, is to use the ‘no number, no list’ response
152
....

The McNair Declaration went on:
Assuming CIA still holds responsive documents, providing a portion of the
withheld responsive documents, or even a list or number of such responsive
documents, would expose sensitive and classified methods and would reveal the
extent of the U.S. collection efforts, analysis and reporting directed at particular
targets. It could further reveal the relative priority that the CIA attached to a particular intelligence subject and indicate where the Agency had allocated its limited resources. This could reveal U.S. policy interests and expose strengths and
gaps in the Agency’s intelligence gathering ability. It would reveal information
153
that could damage U.S. foreign relations.

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1, *4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
Id. at *7.
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Bassiouni argued that there were two critical problems with the McNair
Declaration. First, McNair cited his authority pursuant to Executive Order
12,958, which states that a federal agency may “refuse to confirm or deny the
existence or nonexistence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or nonexistence is itself classified . . . .”154 In other words, Executive
Order 12,958 authorizes a Glomar response.155 After McNair admitted that the
CIA could no longer give a Glomar response, he cited his authority by an Executive Order authorizing one.156 The second, and more important point Bassiouni argued, was that the CIA’s use of a no number, no list response was not
supported by any legal authority, either in the text of FOIA or in any case
law.157 The court summarily rejected both arguments, claiming that it would
not “become fixated with labels or parse semanties [sic].”158
Although the Bassiouni court was not fixated with labels or on parsing semantics, it was intensely focused on meeting the provisions of a FOIAcompliant affidavit, as prescribed in Hunt v. CIA.159 According to Hunt, which
the Bassiouni court cited, an agency’s affidavit meets FOIA’s requirements for
exemption if it: “(1) describes the justifications for non-disclosure with reasonably specific detail; (2) demonstrates that the information withheld logically
falls within the claimed exemptions; and (3) shows that the justifications are
not controverted by evidence in the record or by evidence of bad faith on the
part of the agency.”160 To support the CIA’s position, McNair provided to the
court, in camera, “reasonably specific detail [demonstrating] that the information withheld logically falls within [FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)].”161
The court found that the justifications were “a well-reasoned, specific and plausible basis for concluding that [exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)] preclude further
identification of records responsive to Bassiouni’s request due to the detrimental effects of disclosure on intelligence methods, interests, sources and capabilities, as well as detrimental effects on United States foreign relations.”162
In short, although McNair mistakenly labeled the affidavit a “no number, no
list” response, he had in fact provided the court with nothing less than an in
camera Vaughn index, in full compliance with the requirements of FOIA—the
distinction was lost on the court.163
Despite decades of case law, and even the court’s own direct quote and
comparison to Hunt, which outlines the form of a FOIA-compliant Vaughn in154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Exec. Order No. 12958, 32 C.F.R. 701.23 § 3.7(a) (1995).
See ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
See Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919, at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
Id. (citing Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Id. at *7.
Id.
See id. at *6.
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dex, it held that “the CIA [did] not [waive] the right to assert a ‘no number, no
list’ response to Bassiouni’s FOIA . . . request, and that such a response was
appropriate.”164 Bassiouni appealed.165
B. Bassiouni v. CIA—Court of Appeals
While the district court determined that the differences between a Glomar
and a no number, no list response could be chalked up to semantics,166 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the fundamental misunderstanding a step
further.167 The court considered whether “it would be best to jettison the distinction between” the twenty-nine-year-old judicially created Glomar response,
along with the protections it afforded, together with the nine-month-old CIAcreated no number, no list response, in favor of a new reply that “could cover
both situations”—the “Bassiouni Response.”168 Importantly, as of January 7,
2016, no other court has mentioned the “Bassiouni Response.” Instead, based
on the “legally identical” assertion made by the court (discussed infra), other
courts still accept the CIA’s use of the no number, no list response.
The Seventh Circuit went on to state that neither the Glomar response,
which “[refuses] to acknowledge whether the CIA has even one responsive
document,” nor the no number, no list response, which “[acknowledges] that
the CIA has at least one responsive document but [refuses] to elaborate,” held
any “magic” significance.169 The court held that leaving the Glomar response
and the no number, no list response intact would confuse judges into thinking
“that something depends on the turn of a phrase.”170 It declared the two responses “legally identical”171 and affirmed the district court’s decision.172
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE NO NUMBER, NO LIST RESPONSE
The Seventh Circuit’s “legally identical” assertion in Bassiouni rubberstamped the CIA’s ability to deny FOIA requests at will. Prior to the creation of
the no number, no list response, the CIA denied requests—like all other federal
government agencies subject to FOIA—by providing a list of withheld documents, along with the exemptions it was claiming on each. In special circumstances, when the CIA had not disclosed the existence vel non of records responsive to a request, it issued a Glomar response.173 The requestor could then
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
See generally Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004).
Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919, at *6.
See Bassiouni, 392 F.3d at 247.
Id.
See Bassiouni, 392 F.3d at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
See, e.g., ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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challenge the Vaughn index or the Glomar response in court, where the agency
would attempt to prove that its withheld records were properly exempt under
FOIA.174 If the reviewing court found that the agency’s records were in fact exempt, it would uphold the denial and no information would be disclosed.175 But
critically, where the agency’s records did not fit under at least one of FOIA’s
exemptions, the court compelled disclosure in accordance with the Act.176 The
Vaughn index and the Glomar response complemented each other and preserved the public’s “right to know,”177 while ensuring that the exemptions provided for under FOIA were upheld. After Bassiouni, everything changed.
The holding in Bassiouni was disappointing for two reasons. First, despite
decades of FOIA case law that had developed procedures and safeguards to address circumstances exactly like those presented in Bassiouni, the court “jettison[ed]” the Glomar response to allow for the amorphous no number, no list
response.178 Second, and more importantly, by allowing a government agency
to assert a no number, no list response, the distinction between a Vaughn index
and a Glomar response was effectively destroyed.179 Simply stated, the Seventh
Circuit’s “legally identical” assertion gutted the mechanisms that had allowed
FOIA to operate as Congress had intended.
A. Jarvik v. CIA
Emboldened by its success in the Seventh Circuit, the CIA continued its
use of the no number, no list response in Jarvik v. CIA, where the court took the
misunderstanding further still.180 The Jarvik court gave the no number, no list
response a legal test and what appeared to be an increasingly legitimate purpose
within FOIA’s statutory scheme.181
At issue was a FOIA request, submitted by Laurence Jarvik in 2006, that
sought all records possessed by the CIA “relating to the violence of May 2005
and its aftermath [in Andijan, Uzbekistan], as well as subsequent trials and
evaluation of refugees.”182 The CIA responded to the request, stating that it had
“located [records] which [it] had determined [to be] currently and properly
classified and [therefore, the FOIA request] must be denied in its entirety on the
basis of . . . exemptions (b)(1) & (b)(3).”183 Despite acknowledging that it held
records responsive to the request, the CIA continued by claiming, “the only response [that it] can provide on the public record in this case is the general ‘no
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
See id.
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 154 (1989).
Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 2004).
See id.
See generally Jarvik v. CIA, 741 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2010).
See id. at 123.
Id. at 109.
Id.
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number, no list’ declaration,” because any other response “could reasonably be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security.”184
In the “Factual & Procedural Background” section of its opinion, the Jarvik
Court notes that CIA had “located [records]”185 responsive to the plaintiff’s request. In order to test this assertion, the court looked to Phillippi v. CIA,186 the
Hughes Glomar Explorer case that led to the Glomar response.187 Quoting Phillippi, the court held that where the CIA “can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records, there are no relevant documents for the court
to examine other than the affidavits which explain the [a]gency’s refusal.”188
Despite facts that directly contradicted the legal test being employed, the Jarvik
court held that the Glomar test applied to the CIA’s assertion of a no number,
no list response, and the court thus denied the plaintiff’s request for discovery.189
B. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Courts Begin to Challenge the No
Number, No List Response
More than a decade after its dubious creation, seven courts had heard cases
involving the CIA’s use of the no number, no list response: six of the courts
appeared to accept the Seventh Circuit’s “legally identical” assertion and ruled
accordingly.190 Only the D.C. Circuit noted a “material difference” between a
Glomar and a no number, no list response in ACLU v. CIA:191
A Glomar response requires the agency to argue, and the court to accept, that the
very fact of the existence or nonexistence of responsive records is protected
from disclosure. That is conceptually different from conceding (or being compelled by the court to concede) that the agency has some documents, but nonetheless arguing that any description of those documents would effectively disclose validly exempt information. There may be cases where the agency cannot
plausibly make the former (Glomar) argument with a straight face, but where it
192
can legitimately make the latter.

In dicta, the court found that a no number, no list response might be viewed as
a minimalist form of a Vaughn index, applicable only in very unusual circum-

184

Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
Id. at 109.
186
Id. at 123.
187
See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
188
Jarvik, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (quoting Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013) (emphasis added).
189
Id.
190
See generally ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (giving a brief timeline
of previous no number, no list cases); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123,
126, aff’d in part, 756 F.3d 100, 112, aff’d in part, 758 F.3d 436, supplemented, 762 F.3d
233 (2d Cir. 2014); First Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 12-1013 CW,
2014 WL 1411333, at *1, vacated, 2014 WL 7148340 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014).
191
ACLU, 710 F.3d at 433.
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Id.
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stances, and justified only by a “particularly persuasive affidavit.”193 Although
the court did not reference Bassiouni, this is precisely what the McNair Declaration had provided—a “particularly persuasive affidavit” and an in camera
Vaughn index.194 Unfortunately, the ACLU court’s analysis necessarily ended
with the issues being litigated, and it left no clear direction for other courts to
follow going forward.195
C. N.Y. Times v. U.S. Department of Justice—District Court
The facts in N.Y. Times v. U.S. Department of Justice pushed Bassiouni’s
“legally identical” assertion beyond any form of reason. The FOIA requests at
issue focused primarily on CIA drone strikes that killed three United States citizens in 2011—suspected terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, his son Abdulrahman alAwlaki, and Samir Khan.196 New York Times reporters Scott Shane and Charlie Savage (collectively “N.Y. Times”) and the American Civil Liberties Union
and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (collectively “ACLU”)
each submitted separate, but similar, requests for information concerning the
attacks.197 They specifically requested any documents prepared by the Office of
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regarding the
CIA’s legal justification for targeted killing generally, as well as the extrajudicial execution of United States citizens abroad.198
1. N.Y. Times and ACLU FOIA Requests
Shane’s request to the OLC sought “[A]ll Office of Legal Counsel opinions
or memoranda since 2001 that address the legal status of targeted killings, assassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist
groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.”199 Savage’s request, also submitted to the OLC, sought “[A] copy of all Office of Legal Counsel memorandums analyzing the circumstances under which it would
be lawful for United States armed forces or intelligence community assets to
target for killing a United States citizen who is deemed to be a terrorist.”200
The ACLU submitted identical, but separate, requests201 to (1) the DOJ
(including two of the DOJ’s component agencies—the Office of Information
193

Id.
See Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004)
aff’d, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004); ACLU, 710 F.3d at 433.
195
See ACLU, 710 F.3d at 433.
196
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 104, aff’d in part, 758 F.3d 436,
supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).
197
Id. at 104–06.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 104–05.
200
Id. at 105.
201
Id. at 106 n.6.
194
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1. All records created after September 11, 2001, pertaining to the legal basis in domestic, foreign, and international law upon which U.S. citizens can be subjected to
targeted killings, whether using unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs” or “drones”) or
by other means.
2. All records created after September 11, 2001, pertaining to the process by which
U.S. citizens can be designated for targeted killings, including who is authorized to
make such determinations and what evidence is needed to support them.
3. All memoranda, opinions, drafts, correspondence, and other records produced by
the OLC after September 11, 2001, pertaining to the legal basis in domestic, foreign,
and international law upon which the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki was authorized and upon which he was killed, including discussions of:
A. The reasons why domestic-law prohibitions on murder, assassination, and excessive use of force did not preclude the targeted killing of al-Awlaki;
B. The protection and requirements imposed by the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause;
C. The reasons why International-law prohibitions on extrajudicial killing did not preclude the targeted killing of al-Awlaki;
D. The applicability (or non-applicability) of the Treason Clause to the decision
whether to target al-Awlaki;
E. The legal basis authorizing the CIA, JSOC, or other U.S. Government entities to
carry out the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki;
F. Any requirement for proving that al-Awlaki posed an imminent risk of harm to
others, including an explanation of how to define imminence in this context; and
G. Any requirement that the U.S. Government first attempt to capture Al-Awlaki before killing him.
4. All documents and records pertaining to the factual basis for the targeted killing of
Al-Awlaki, including:
A. Facts supporting a belief that al-Awlaki posed an imminent threat to the United
States or United States interests;
B. Facts supporting a belief that al-Awlaki could not be captured or brought to justice
using nonlethal means;
C. Facts indicating that there was a legal justification for killings persons other than
al-Awlaki, including other U.S. citizens, while attempting to kill al-Awlaki himself;
D. Facts supporting the assertion that al-Awlaki was operationally involved in al
Qaeda, rather than being involved merely in propaganda activities; and
E. Any other facts relevant to the decision to authorize and execute the targeted killings of al-Awlaki.
5. All documents and records pertaining to the factual basis for the killing of Samir
Khan, including whether he was intentionally targeted, whether U.S. Government
personnel were aware of his proximity to al-Awlaki at the time the missiles were
launched at al-Awlaki’s vehicle, whether the United States took measures to avoid
Khan’s death, and any other facts relevant to the decision to kill Khan or the failure to
avoid causing his death.
6. All documents and records pertaining to the factual basis for the killing of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, including whether he was intentionally targeted, whether U.S.
Government personnel were aware of his presence when they launched a missile or
missiles at his location, whether he was targeted on the basis of his kinship with
Anwar al-Awlaki, whether the United States took measures to avoid his death, and
any other factors relevant to the decision to kill him or the failure to avoid causing his
death.
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Policy (“OIP”) and the OLC); (2) the DOD; (3) and the CIA (collectively
“Government”).202 The ACLU’s requests sought any documents concerning the
targeted killings of United States citizens generally, as well as any documents
specifically related to al-Awlaki, his son, and Khan.203
2. Government Responses
The OLC bifurcated Shane’s FOIA request, and denied both parts.204 First,
the OLC acknowledged involvement with the DOD, but submitted a no number, no list response pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5).205
Second, the OLC submitted a “Glomar response” regarding documents pertaining to agencies other than the DOD.206
The OLC also denied Savage’s request, and submitted a Glomar response
asserting exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5).207 Unlike its response to Shane,
the OLC’s initial response to Savage “did not identify responsive documents
relating to the DOD.”208 During litigation, the OLC modified its response to
both reporters to acknowledge the existence of one document, referred to as the
“OLC–DOD Memorandum,” but claimed that it was exempt from disclosure
under exemption (b)(5).209 After acknowledging the existence of an OLC-DOD
relationship, the OLC did not make clear whether it was continuing to assert a
no number, no list response, as it had made to Shane, or a Glomar response, as
it had made to Savage.210
The OLC provided the ACLU with a Vaughn index that listed sixty unclassified email chains, each reflecting “internal deliberations”211 regarding extrajudicial lethal force against United States citizens.212 The OLC withheld the
emails pursuant to exemption (b)(5).213 It also submitted a no number, no list
response, stating that the remaining records were protected from disclosure by
exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).214 The DOD provided the ACLU with a speech
given at Yale Law School in 2012 by then DOD General Counsel Jeh Johnson,
and a Vaughn index that listed ten unclassified records, withheld pursuant to
exemption (b)(5).215 The DOD also acknowledged that it possessed the OLC–
202
203
204
205
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207
208
209
210
211
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214
215

Id.
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see supra note 84 (text of FOIA defining these exemptions).
N.Y. Times, 756 F.3d at 105.
Id. at 105–06; see supra note 84 (text of FOIA defining these exemptions).
N.Y. Times, 756 F.3d at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
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DOD Memorandum, but withheld it under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(5).216 The
DOD submitted a no number, no list response for all other responsive records.217
3. The Court’s Holding
Dissatisfied with the Government’s sweeping and unsubstantiated responses, the N.Y. Times and the ACLU filed a consolidated action in U.S. District
Court, seeking an injunctive order to compel the disclosure of the OLC-DOD
Memorandum, as well as Vaughn indices for all withheld documents, rather
than the no number, no list and Glomar responses they had received.218
The district court acknowledged that “[t]he FOIA requests [at] issue implicate serious issues about the limits on the power of the Executive Branch under
the Constitution and laws of the United States.”219 The court continued “[t]he
Administration has engaged in public discussion of the legality of targeted killing, even of [United States] citizens, but in cryptic and imprecise ways, generally without citing to any statute or court decision that justifies its conclusions.”220 But the court, finding itself “constrained by law,”221 could “only
conclude that the Government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over
the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled . . . to
explain . . . why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States.”222 The court declared that
The Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and
rules—a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and
precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to
proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible
with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a
223
secret.

After claiming it was bound by precedent, the court considered the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the Glomar and no number, no list responses.224 It
began by finding that, contrary to the holding in Bassiouni, a Glomar and a no
number, no list response are in fact separate and distinct concepts, and that their
structures are not “legally identical.”225 But the court’s analysis of the issue
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
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Id. at 108.
Id.
See N.Y. Times v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 508–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515–16.
See id. at 551–52.
Id. at 550.
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ended there.226 After finding that the core holding in Bassiouni was incorrect,
the court looked to the same body of erroneous case law—Bassiouni and Jarvik—to determine that “Glomar law should be used to evaluate the propriety of
a No Number, No List response.”227 Accordingly, the court applied the Glomar
test to all the Government’s responses and found the plaintiffs’ objections to
the Glomar and no number, no list responses to be “without merit.”228 It granted summary judgment in favor of the Government.229
D. N.Y. Times v. U.S. Department of Justice—Court of Appeals
On appeal, N.Y. Times and the ACLU pressed for the disclosure of the
OLC-DOD Memorandum and Vaughn indices for all withheld documents.230 In
its discussion, the N.Y. Times court of appeals focused on the Government’s assertion that disclosure of the legal analysis in the OLC-DOD Memorandum
would jeopardize national security by revealing “military plans, intelligence activities, sources and methods . . . .”231 It also focused on the Government’s assertion that even if the legal analysis could be disclosed, it would still pose a
threat to national security because it would identify the agency or agencies
“that had an operational role in the drone strike that killed al-Awlaki.”232
In its evaluation of the Government’s claims, the N.Y. Times court of appeals referenced several public pronouncements made by government officials
that concerned the legal analysis of targeted killings, and the CIA’s direct involvement in the program.233 Speaking at Northwestern University in 2012, Attorney General Holder stated:
[I]t is entirely lawful—under both United States law and applicable law of war
principles—to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated forces . . . [if] [f]irst, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough
and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war princi234
ples.

The Attorney General emphasized the last point by saying that the “use of lethal force by the United States will comply with the four fundamental law of
war principles governing the use of force . . . necessity[,] . . . distinction[,] . . .

226

See id. at 551.
Id.
228
Id. at 553.
229
Id.
230
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 112, aff’d in part, 758 F.3d 436,
supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 119.
232
Id. at 118.
233
Id. at 114–15, 118.
234
Id. at 114.
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proportionality[,] . . . [and] humanity.”235 In March 2010, then CIA Director
Leon Panetta said:
Anytime we get a high value target that is in the top leadership of al Qaeda, it
seriously disrupts their operations . . . . It [sends] two important signals . . . . No.
1 that we are not going to hesitate to go after them wherever they try to hide, and
236
No. 2 that we are continuing to target their leadership.

The court noted that “the reference to ‘we’ [did] not unequivocally [implicate
the] CIA, and might arguably be taken as a reference to the Government generally,”237 but found this doubt was eliminated by a statement Panetta made three
months later:238
[We] are engaged in the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA in
that part of the world, and the result is that we are disrupting their leadership.
We’ve taken down more than half of their Taliban leadership, of their Al Qaida
leadership. We just took down number three in their leadership a few weeks
239
ago.

Panetta also stated:
[Al-]Awlaki is a terrorist and yes, he’s a United States citizen, but he is first and
foremost a terrorist and we’re going to treat him like a terrorist. We don’t have
an assassination list, but I can tell you this. We have a terrorist list and he’s on
240
it.

Furthermore, in October 2011, Panetta, then acting as Secretary of Defense,
said “[h]aving moved from the CIA to the Pentagon, obviously I have a hell of
a lot more weapons available to me in this job than I had at the CIA, although
the Predators aren’t bad.”241 Then, in 2012, Scott Pelley of the television program “60 Minutes” asked Panetta, “ ‘You killed al-Awlaki?’ Panetta ‘nodded
affirmatively.’ ”242 Next, Panetta was asked about targeting a person who has
been identified as an enemy combatant. Panetta said, “It’s a recommendation
we make, it’s a recommendation the CIA director makes in my prior role
. . . .”243 Finally, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennen, testified in
front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2013, saying,
“[t]he Office of Legal Counsel advice establishes the legal boundaries within
which [the CIA] can operate.”244
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After reviewing the statements made by Attorney General Holder, current
Director of the CIA John Brennan, and Leon Panetta in his roles as both Director of the CIA and as the Secretary of Defense, the court determined:
After senior Government officials have assured the public that targeted killings
are “lawful” and that OLC advice “establishes the legal boundaries within which
[the CIA] can operate,” and the Government makes public a detailed analysis of
nearly all the legal reasoning contained in the OLC-DOD Memorandum, waiver
of secrecy and privilege as to the legal analysis in the Memorandum has oc245
curred.

The court was careful to clarify that the waiver of protection regarding the legal
analysis in the OLC-DOD Memorandum did not mean that the entire document
would need to be disclosed.246 It cited FOIA, stating “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record
after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.”247 The
court found that only parts II-VI of the OLC-DOD Memorandum had been officially acknowledged, and ordered only those parts disclosed.248
The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the validity of
no number, no list and Glomar responses.249 After quoting then CIA Director
Panetta’s direct acknowledgement of the CIA’s use of armed drones, the court
held that “the [Government’s] main argument for the use of Glomar and no
number, no list responses evaporates.”250 In accordance with its holding, the
court ordered the DOD and CIA to submit classified Vaughn indices for in
camera inspection and disclosure on remand to the district court.251 Finally, a
court demanded that the CIA substantiate its exemptions in accordance with the
provisions of FOIA.
IV. THE BEST WAY FORWARD
The “Alice-in-Wonderland”252 analogy made by the district court in N.Y.
Times v. CIA signals a fundamental breakdown in the judicial application of the
Act. Congress did not enact FOIA to “allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim . . . actions that seem . . . incompatible with our Constitution [to be perfectly lawful], while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.”253 Congress enacted FOIA “to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to

245
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Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
Id.
See id. at 122.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 515–16.

16 NEV. L.J. 345, MEISSNER - FINAL.DOCX

Fall 2015]

NO NUMBER, NO LIST RESPONSE

1/26/16 1:18 PM

371

hold the governors accountable to the governed.”254 That is why clear, consistently enforced procedures regarding the Vaughn index and the Glomar response are absolutely critical to the ongoing viability of FOIA.
The opinion written by the court of appeals in N.Y. Times was spot-on, but
its rationale was virtually eclipsed by the messy intersection of the Glomar,
Vaughn, and no number, no list responses. Although the court deftly cut
through the myriad FOIA requests originating from three different sources, as
well as the varying replies from the OLC, DOD, and the CIA, it did not directly
address the no number, no list response, nor provide a clear framework for other courts going forward. Perhaps the court did not find it necessary; after all,
the Vaughn index has been a judicial construct of FOIA exemptions since
1973,255 and the Glomar response has been used since 1976.256 Nevertheless,
the fact remains that without supplying the court with a “particularly persuasive
affidavit”257 justifying the reasons for its withholding, the CIA is operating outside of the law when submitting a no number, no list response.258
Although a no number, no list response may technically comply with FOIA
when it takes the form of an in camera Vaughn index, the CIA’s abuse of the
response has left little, if anything, worth salvaging. A better standard would be
to eliminate the no number, no list response altogether, and return to the clearly
defined legal framework provided for by the Vaughn index and the Glomar response.
Enforcing FOIA does not require any judicial or extrajudicial imagination.
To return to FOIA-compliant law, reviewing courts should begin by examining
the withholding agency’s Vaughn index. If a publicly disclosed, detailed
Vaughn index would legitimately compromise government interests in national
security, the agency may request in camera inspection.259 At that point, the
court will ensure that legitimate issues of national security are not disclosed. In
the most extreme situations, where an agency has not officially disclosed the
existence vel non of records relating to the request, and the very existence of
the information is protected under one or more of FOIA’s exemptions, a
Glomar response may be properly invoked.260 Where an agency may properly
invoke a Glomar response, it must supply the court with an in camera affidavit
“giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall
within an exemption,”261 allowing the court to ensure that the public’s “right to
information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and mischar-
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NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
See id. at 433–34.
Id. at 433.
Id.
ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2012).
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acterization . . . .”262 If a court follows this structure, and therefore the law, the
no number, no list response will be unnecessary even in the most sensitive of
cases.
CONCLUSION
For years, the CIA has been evading valid judicial proceedings by using
unsubstantiated no number, no list responses. Between the incorrect “legally
identical”263 assertion made by the Seventh Circuit in 2004, and the Vaughn index, which legitimately offers the court broad discretion in determining the
requisite level of detail on a case-by-case basis, the true purpose behind FOIA’s
exemptions has been all but lost.
Today, amidst America’s ongoing Global War on Terror, an everincreasing number of erroneous CIA drone strikes264 coupled with targeted killings that mirror extrajudicial assassinations265 make it more important than ever
to uphold the purpose behind the Act. By eliminating the no number, no list response and applying the actual, long-standing FOIA rules across the board, the
judiciary will not only ensure that legitimate matters of national security remain
confidential, it will also ensure that the CIA does not operate above the law.
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Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 2004).
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See supra notes 60–64.
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See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014); Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233
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